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Abstract:  
We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player 
public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, 
distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that 
endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules under 
random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a 
VCM occur, though being largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM. 
By apparently influencing the perception of fair burden sharing, the endowment allocation 
procedure crucially impacts voluntary contributions under VCM, while the rule-based 
mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though endowment heterogeneity 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many problems in public economics, in particular the voluntary provision of public goods, 
require appropriate institutional mechanisms to achieve a burden sharing that is perceived to 
be “fair” by the relevant stakeholders. 1 As such, cooperation on the provision of public goods 
is particularly challenging if individual preferences for burden sharing schemes differ among 
heterogeneous agents. Individual perceptions on what constitutes a fair distribution of 
cooperation gains from the provision of a public good may depend on agents’ initial roles 
within a group of heterogeneous players, but also on issues regarding procedural fairness, i.e. 
under which circumstances and how these different positions accrue. That is, preferences for 
burden sharing schemes may depend on whether a person considers its current individual 
position within a society being determined mainly by its own decisions and achievements or 
rather as exogenously given. The accountability principle as a prominent concept within the 
theory of economic fairness, for instance, is inspired by ideas of proportionality and 
responsibility. It requires “that a person’s entitlement or fair allocation (e.g., of income) varies 
in proportion to the relevant variables which he can influence (e.g., work effort), but not 
according to those which he cannot reasonably influence (e.g., a physical handicap)” (Konow 
1996: p.14). Following this idea, a random allocation of different initial positions within a 
group of agents may foster claims for a fairness norm tending to equalize payoffs whereas an 
allocation based on individual efforts may rather provoke a distribution rule that assigns equal 
contributions to all types of players.  
Against this background, we show in a related paper that the equal-payoff rule outperforms 
other distribution rules as well as the voluntary contribution mechanism in a public goods 
game when randomly allocated benefits from the public good differ between agents 
(Kesternich et al. 2014). Specifically, we investigate the performance of mechanisms which 
first require agents to agree upon a common group provision level of the public good (via 
implementing the minimum of proposals from group members, i.e. the smallest common 
denominator), before this is allocated across agents according to some predetermined burden 
sharing rule, without allowing for a direct redistribution of initial endowments. While the 
identified dominance of the payoff-equalizing rule is consistent with inequality-averse players 
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999), it is noteworthy that payoff-equalization can be achieved 
already for low levels of total public good provision since agents start with equal 
                                                     
1 Ongoing discussions in international climate policy on historical responsibility of current generations in industrialized countries for past 
emissions and the right for economic development in emerging countries may serve as a prominent example. 
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endowments. This is different when agents are heterogeneous with respect to endowments, a 
clearly highly realistic setting. 
This paper experimentally tests the performance of rule-based contribution mechanisms 
relative to a voluntary contribution scheme (VCM) under endowment heterogeneities. In a 
repeated 4-player public goods game, we particularly focus on the impact of the procedure by 
which heterogeneous endowments are allocated to the respective players. The minimum 
contribution rules are inspired by two different fairness norms: equality in contributions and 
equality in payoffs. While the former norm may serve as a simple focal point which allows 
players to easily coordinate on contributions, the latter norm leads to a more differentiated 
burden regime but may be attractive if individuals were inequality-averse (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002). In order to account for 
procedural fairness we distinguish between a random- and an effort-based allocation of 
individual endowments to mimic various underlying procedures leading to initial 
heterogeneity within a group. One may expect the equal-payoff rule to lose some 
attractiveness if endowment heterogeneities were earned rather than randomly determined: the 
equal-payoff scheme requires larger contributions from rich players, while potentially existing 
inequality-aversion of players with high endowment may be reduced due to the effort-based 
allocation of endowments. The experiment in this paper may, thus, be interpreted as a 
“robustness check” for the efficiency increasing effects of burden sharing schemes, in 
particular of the equal-payoff rule.  
Our experimental results indicate that the efficiency gains from rule-based contribution 
mechanisms relative to VCM are limited when different endowment levels are randomly 
allocated. Neither an equal-payoff nor an equal-contribution scheme lead to significantly 
larger provision levels of the public good, while they clearly affect the distribution of 
contributions. This finding stands in stark contrast to our previous findings. Together we can 
therefore conclude that different dimensions of heterogeneity, i.e. endowments vs. marginal 
benefits, substantially influence fairness perceptions and therewith the performance of 
specific distributional rule-based mechanism. 
Interestingly, this picture changes under effort allocation of endowments: here, both rule-
based contribution schemes generate larger average profits than VCM. The difference between 
effort-based and random allocation thereby is in part driven by the different behavior under 
the VCM: here, we observe a substantially smaller average contribution under effort-based 
allocation than under random allocation which originates from lower contributions by agents 
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with high endowments. That is, voluntary contributions by highly-endowed players are 
reduced if those feel they deserved the higher income. Under effort, rule-based contribution 
schemes therefore successfully counteract coordination failures and typical downward trends 
in contributions in VCM. 
However, the allocation procedure also affects the behavior in the different burden sharing 
mechanisms. When the equal-contribution rule is applied, agents with low endowment make 
lower minimum proposals under effort-based than under random allocation, thereby 
“accepting” disadvantageous inequality. Differently, agents with high endowment tend to 
increase their minimum proposal under the equal-payoff rule when comparing effort-based 
with random allocation. Overall, however, the equal-payoff rule under endowment 
heterogeneity lifts less than half of the possible efficiency gains across players. In a 
robustness check, we consider an increase in marginal benefits (for low-type agents) which – 
under the equal-payoff rule – would benefit both players: in it, we do not see enhanced 
coordination. As such, our results indicate that the performance of specific rule-based 
mechanisms is limited in the presence of endowment heterogeneities among players. 
The paper is structured as follows: We summarize related literature in Section 2, before laying 
out the theoretical predictions for our treatments in Section 3. Section 4 explains the 
experimental design, before the experimental results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
This paper is related to several recent studies on contributions mechanisms that rely on a 
smallest common denominator rule have been found in the literature (e.g., Orzen 2008, 
Dannenberg et al. 2014) to be effective in enhancing cooperation gains in homogeneous 
settings or under heterogeneity with respect to benefits from the public good (Kesternich et al. 
2014). However, these studies did not investigate endowment heterogeneities. The literature 
on the impact of endowment heterogeneities in a public goods context largely focuses on 
contribution behavior in traditional VCM schemes. It is found to be sensitive to the 
distribution of initial wealth but also to be affected by the endowment’s origin and the reason 
for endowment heterogeneity among agents – thereby motivating our study on the 
performance of different distribution rules in rule-based mechanisms. 
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In a meta-analysis on the experimental literature on the voluntary public goods provision 
Zelmer (2003) finds endowment heterogeneity among agents to have a significantly negative 
impact on contribution behavior. Experimental results from a prisoner’s dilemma experiment 
with heterogeneous initial endowments but homogeneous benefits suggest that subjects 
earning their endowments contribute more to the joint project when they are matched with 
subjects whose endowment is randomly allocated (Spraggon and Oxoby 2009). In contrast, 
studies by Chan et al. (1996, 1999) and Buckley and Croson (2006) provide evidence for a 
rather positive effect of endowment heterogeneity on the group provision level. Similarly, 
Georgantzis and Proestakis (2011) find heterogeneity in lab incomes to have a positive effect 
both on absolute and relative contribution levels but this does not hold when additional 
information on real wealth inequality of participants is available. Further recent experimental 
evidence on the effect of endowment heterogeneity and the relevance of information or 
communication is, among others, given by Anderson et al. (2008), Koukoumelis et al. (2010), 
and van Dijk et al. (2002).  
The literature on the impact of the origin of endowment differences on individual behavior in 
public goods games appears ambiguous. On the one hand, Harrison and El Mouden (2011) 
report that the requirement for endowments to be earned through labor reduces cooperation in 
the public goods game among a subset of participants (those who were not familiar with game 
theory). On the other hand, Cherry et al. (2005) find no effect of the origin of endowments 
(windfall vs. earned) on contributions. Reinstein and Riener (2012) show in a charitable 
giving experiment that the probability of donating decreases if endowments are earned in 
contrast of being randomly allocated. In the same vain, Cherry (2001), Cherry et al. (2002), 
and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) observe that selfish behavior in a dictator game significantly 
increases when the money has to be earned in a task previous to the genuine experiment. 
Our study on the performance of different distribution-rules under endowment heterogeneity 
is further related to a stream of the experimental literature which aims at tying contribution 
behavior to social norms based on different fairness principles. Reuben and Riedl (2013) find 
contributions to be proportional to endowments if punishment is allowed and contribution 
possibilities are unrestricted. Kittel et al. (2012) focus on group decisions on redistribution in 
a 3-player real-effort experiment. After endowments being allocated among participants 
according to their performance in a quiz task in the first stage, the group agrees upon 
redistribution of endowments by different voting rules, i.e. majority and unanimity, in the 
second stage. Their experimental results indicate tendencies of equalization of profits under a 
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majority rule because of a coalition against the rich player. They conclude that “equity 
concerns become irrelevant against the pressure for equality” (p.26) if initial endowments are 
skewed and a majority rule is applied. In dictator games, experimental evidence suggest 
allocation decisions in many cases to correspond to certain fairness principles such as 
egalitarianism (i.e., equalizing all inequalities) or libertarianism (i.e., to allocate to each 
person what he or she produces) (e.g., Frohlich et al. 2004, Cappelen et al. 2007, Ubeda 
2010). As mentioned above, in a previous experimental setting (Kesternich et al. 2014), we 
find that rule-based contribution schemes lead to substantial cooperation gains if agents differ 
in their benefits from the public good. In particular, we observe that a burden sharing rule 
aiming at equalizing payoffs by explicitly addressing redistribution among heterogeneous 
agents payoff-dominates all other burden sharing mechanisms. This paper considers the 
robustness of these results under endowment heterogeneity. 
3. TREATMENT DESCRIPTION AND THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
The experimental design includes several treatments that vary along two important 
dimensions: (i) we study different institutions which may reduce free-riding incentives when 
agents are heterogeneous with respect to income, and (ii) we investigate how the performance 
of these institutions depends on the way income positions are allocated, i.e. randomly or based 
on effort. 
Along the first dimension, we test in particular two rule-based contribution schemes that are 
inspired by different notions of distributional fairness, i.e. equality in contributions (eqcont) 
and equality in payoffs (eqpay) and compare them to the standard voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM).  
The payoff to player 𝑖, 𝜋𝑖, is determined by a linear public goods game and given by 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑄 
where 𝑒𝑖 marks the initial individual endowment,  𝑞𝑖 the individual contribution to the public 
good, 𝑏𝑖 the marginal benefit from the joint project and 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑛𝑗=1  the aggregated provision 
level of the public good. 
Players in our experimental setting differ by their initial endowment: each group of four 
players (𝑛 = 4) consists of two low-type players with an endowment of 𝑒𝐿 = 10 and two 
high-type players with 𝑒𝐻 = 30.  Therefore, there is a total group endowment 𝐸 =
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∑ 𝑒𝑗 = 80𝑛𝑗=1  and we have 𝑞𝐿  ∈ [0,10]  and 𝑞𝐻  ∈ [0,30] , respectively. We focus on 
treatments which assume identical marginal benefits ( 𝑏𝑖 = 0.4 < 1)  across all group 
members (in treatments VCM, eqcont and eqpay). We also include a robustness check for the 
equal-payoff mechanism where low-type players benefit disproportionally large from 
contributions to the public good (𝑏𝐻 = 0.4, 𝑏𝐿 = 0.8), in MPCR-eqpay). 
The rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont and eqpay) consist of two stages: In the first 
stage, the minimum stage, all players simultaneously suggest a minimum group provision 
level 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,80]. 2 The smallest suggested proposal then determines the lower level for the 
sum of individual contributions in the second stage: 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗𝜖𝑆 𝑄𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 where 𝑆 is the set of 
players in a group. In the second stage, the contribution stage, the minimum individual 
contribution level, 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 , is derived from the binding minimum group provision level 
according to the specific predetermined burden sharing rule, i.e. 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛�𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛�. 3 Subjects have 
to contribute at least the minimum contribution level 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 , i.e. 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛  but can go 
voluntarily beyond this level. 
The schemes differ in the underlying burden sharing principle: equal contributions (eqcont) 
vs. equal payoffs (eqpay). Depending on the suggested level 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛, these principles cannot be 
fully realized as we do not allow for redistribution of initial endowments. In eqcont, the 
individual minimum contribution is given by 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛/4 if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 40, and 𝑞𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 10 
and 𝑞𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 10 + (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 40)/2  if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 40 . That is, equal contributions can only be 
enforced as minimum requirement if the level assigned to the low-type agents does not exceed 
their endowment. Any additional level above 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 40 has to be equally allocated across 
the two high-type players.  
Full equalization of income would require 
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛  = �𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛� − 𝐸+𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛(∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 −1)𝑛 .     (1) 
In eqpay, given 𝑒𝐿 = 10 and 𝑒𝐻 = 30, 𝑏𝑖 = 0.4, this is only possible if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 40 where 
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑖 − (𝐸 − 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛)/𝑛 . For 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 40 , payoffs are maximally equalized when 
demanding all contributions to come from high-type agents, i.e. 𝑞𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0  and 𝑞𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛/2. 
                                                     
2 Multiples of four are required. 
3 For deriving minimum individual contribution levels, integer numbers are required. 
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In MPCR-eqpay, given 𝑒𝐿 = 10  and 𝑒𝐻 = 30 , 𝑏𝐻 = 0.4  and 𝑏𝐿 = 0.8 , full payoff 
equalization according to (1) is only possible for 0 ≤ −10 + 0.45𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 10  or 22.2 ≤
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 44.4. Noting that 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛  is constrained to multiples of 4, we obtain 𝑞𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 and 
𝑞𝐻
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛/2  for 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 20 , 𝑞𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 10  and 𝑞𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛 = (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 20)/2  for 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 44 , 
while 𝑞𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = −10 + 0.45𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑞𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 10 + 0.05𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 for 20 < 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 44.  
With these definitions of the treatments, we turn to the theoretical predictions. We concentrate 
on payoff-maximizing preferences. The predictions are graphically summarized in Figure 1. 
In the VCM, theory clearly predicts full free-riding and zero contributions in the Nash 
equilibrium with individual earnings 𝜋𝐿 = 𝑒𝐿 and 𝜋𝐻 = 𝑒𝐻.  
In all burden sharing schemes, the same free-riding argument leads agents to contribute 
exactly the minimum level, 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 . Anticipating this, agents consider their potential 
impact on payoffs from suggesting 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛. Their suggestion only has effect if it is binding, i.e. 
𝑄𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
It follows that, e.g. in eqcont, low-type players’ payoff is increasing in 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 such that they 
have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 = 80. High-type players would only 
benefit from increasing 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 as long as 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 40. As such, high-type agents have a weakly 
dominant strategy to choose 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 40. Therefore, a subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly 
dominant strategies is characterized by  𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 40, 𝑞𝐿 = 𝑞𝐻 = 10 which results in 𝜋𝐿 = 16  
and 𝜋𝐻 = 36. 4   
Applying the same logic to eqpay, implies that, again, low-type players have a weakly 
dominant strategy to suggest full contribution, i.e. 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 80. High-type players’ payoffs are 
first decreasing, then increasing in 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 . As such, they do not have a weakly dominant 
strategy. Instead, they should suggest full contribution levels if they expect low-type agents to 
propose a minimum of 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 68. For any proposal from low-type agents 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 68, high-
type players prefer 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0. The payoff dominant equilibrium is given by 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 80 with 
equal payoffs at 𝜋𝐿 = 𝜋𝐻 = 32 with 𝑞𝐿 = 10 and 𝑞𝐻 = 30.5 However, as high-type players 
do not have a weakly dominant strategy, one may expect reaching this equilibrium to be more 
                                                     
4 If agents prefer to equalize payoffs they can make use of this mechanism in order to equalize their earnings by adjusting their minimum 
proposals. To reach the highest possible equal payoffs under this burden sharing scheme, agents have to choose the contributions 𝑞𝐿 = 10, 
𝑞𝐻 = 30 which result in 𝜋𝐿 = 𝜋𝐻 = 32. This would be possible, for instance, if all agents agree upon 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 40 and high-types voluntarily 
contribute more than their minimum contribution level. 
5 The highest possible payoffs with equal contributions (𝑞𝐿 = 𝑞𝐻 = 10) under the equal-payoff rule are  𝜋𝐿 = 16  and 𝜋𝐻 = 36. To achieve 
this allocation, subjects could, for instance, agree on 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 20 and low-types voluntarily contribute more. 
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complicated than in eqcont (as well as compared to the treatments in Kesternich et al. 2014, 
where players had homogenous endowments). 
Finally, in MPCR-eqpay, low-type players again have weakly dominant strategy to suggest 
𝑄𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 , while high-type agents would be predicted to suggest 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 44 if low-types 
would suggest at least 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 40  (again see Figure 1). For any proposal from low-type 
players 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 40 , high-type players prefer 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.  Therefore, the payoff dominant 
equilibrium in MPCR-eqpay is characterized by 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 44, 𝑞𝐿 = 10,  𝑞𝐻 = 12 which results 
in 𝜋𝐿 = 35.2  and 𝜋𝐻 = 35.6. 6  
Note that we also vary the procedure of allocating the subject’s endowments: it is allocated 
either randomly or according to the performance in an effort-related task. For payoff 
maximizing agents, the theoretical predictions are not to be sensitive to the endowments’ 
origin. But given the experimental literature on earned versus windfall endowments (see 
Section 2) there are reasonable doubts on the hypothesis that the performance of rule-based 
contribution schemes may not be sensitive to the way how the endowment emerges. Our 
design, thus, aims at investigating whether the efficiency gains through those schemes are also 
observed when subjects have to show effort for earning endowment. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We conducted the experiment at the MaXLab laboratory of the University of Magdeburg in 
Germany with 336 students from various academic disciplines in October 2012 and July 
2013. We ran 14 sessions with 24 subjects each. We used ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for 
recruiting and z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007) for programming. Subjects of each session 
were divided randomly into six groups with four players with two high-type and two low-type 
agents. The group composition remained fixed throughout the experiment (partner matching).  
At the beginning of each session, participants went through a set of neutrally-worded 
experimental instructions (see appendix) with verbal descriptions of the game and numerical 
examples. These instructions also contained some control questions to ensure that every 
participant understood the game. After that, the experiment was run on the computer. 
Information on player’s type (high-type or low-type player), contributions (in tokens) and 
payoffs (in Labdollars LD) was provided via screen. The four subjects of one group received 
                                                     
6 The highest possible payoffs with equal contributions (𝑞𝐿 = 𝑞𝐻 = 10) under the equal-payoff rule with heterogeneous marginal benefits 
are  𝜋𝐿 = 32  and 𝜋𝐻 = 36. To achieve this allocation, subjects could, for instance, agree on 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 20 and low-types voluntarily contribute 
more. 
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full information on minimum proposals, individual and average contributions and payoffs 
within their group. Furthermore, each subject knew which group member was a high-type and 
which was a low-type player. The experimental design is summarized in Table 1.  
We consider seven different treatments. Each treatment was conducted in two sessions, we 
have 12 independent observations per treatment. In three of the seven treatments (R-VCM, R-
eqcont, R-eqpay) subjects were randomly chosen to be a low- or a high-type player at the 
beginning of the experiment. In four treatments (E-VCM, E-eqcont, E-eqpay, E-MPCR-
eqpay), the performance of the players within one group in a real effort task determined 
whether a player became a high-type or a low-type.  
The real effort was introduced by a slider task (Gill and Prowse 2011, 2012). We provide a 
screenshot in the appendix (Figure 4). The task is given by a single screen containing 48 
sliders which players have to position exactly at 50 within a time frame of 180 seconds. For 
each slider, correctly positioned at the end of the time period, one point is allocated to the 
subject’s point score. There was information on the own current point score and the amount of 
time remaining on the screen. Separated instructions for the slider task were transmitted via 
screen to the participants. Furthermore, we implemented a trial phase of 30 seconds at the 
beginning of the real effort task to make participants familiar with the slider task and avoid 
technical problems. After the real effort task was finished, the two subjects with the highest 
point score within one group became high-type players in the public goods game; the 
remaining two players became low-type players. Subjects were only informed about their own 
point score after the real effort task. If there was a tie, if necessary lots were drawn 
automatically by the computer to take the final decision. This happened in three out of 48 
groups.  
A session consisted of 12 rounds, including two practice rounds at the beginning. Individual 
earnings were chosen randomly out of one none-practice round at the end of the experiment 
and paid out confidentially. The exchange rate between Euro and LD was 1:2. Sessions, on 
average, lasted about 60 minutes with windfall allocations and about 70 minutes if the real 
effort task was part of the treatment. Subjects on average earned about 13 Euros. We did not 
pay any additional show-up fee.  
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Table 2 reports average contributions and average profits for each treatment across all 
periods, and across the first and second half of the sessions. We further provide results of non-
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parametric Mann-Whitney U tests (MW-U) in Table 4. Moreover, Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot 
contribution behavior and profits over time. Further statistical evidence is given by a series of 
random effects regression models (see Table 6 and Table 8) which control for treatment 
differences, time effects and some socio-demographic variables (gender, lab experience, 
economics student y/n). Throughout the paper our discussion is primarily based on the non-
parametric tests in order to avoid repetitions. We refer to the regression results only in cases 
where differences between the two statistical methods appear. 
Initial insights into the respective treatments are best obtained by considering contribution 
behavior. Averaged over all periods (excluding trial periods) and agents, contributions are 
lowest in VCM under effort (4.3 tokens) and highest in an equal-payoff scheme under effort 
(9.6) (see Table 2). If we focus on the second part of the sessions (periods 6-10) the picture is 
even more pronounced: In the last 5 periods, average contributions decline to 2.9 in E-VCM 
and stabilize at 9.5 in E-eqpay. In general, as can be derived from Figure 2, average 
contributions in our rule-based contribution schemes rather quickly stabilize after the first 
periods and tend to be successful in counteracting typical downward trends in contribution 
patterns in VCM over time. Further evidence for this observation is provided by our regression 
results (Table 6, columns 1-3) and non-parametric tests on time trends (Table 7): While 
contributions clearly decline in VCM over time (p<0.01), there is only weak statistical 
evidence for decreasing contributions in eqcont (both variants) and for R-eqpay (p<0.1). In an 
equal-payoff scheme with effort-based allocation our results do suggest contributions to be 
stable over time.  
For the further discussion on the performance of rule-based mechanisms, we focus on the last 
5 periods. The tables also report the results for the first 5 periods as wells as for averages 
across all 10 periods.  
It is instructive to first consider the performance of rule-based mechanisms vs. VCM under 
random allocation as this can directly be linked to the results under heterogeneity with respect 
to marginal benefits as reported in Kesternich et al. (2014). While Kesternich et al. (2014) 
find both equal-contribution and equal-payoff rule to lead to significantly larger contributions 
(and payoffs) than the VCM, we do not find such result when heterogeneous endowments are 
randomly allocated. Instead, the contribution averages in R-eqcont (7.6) and R-eqpay (6.5) are 
not significantly larger than in VCM (5.8) (MW-U, Table 4, see also regressions Table 6, 
column 4). The different mechanisms have, however, distributional consequences: 
contributions by low-type players are larger under R-eqcont than under R-eqpay (p<0.05, 
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MW-U) and VCM (p<0.01, MW-U). This directly leads high-type players to have larger 
payoffs in R-eqcont than in the other two mechanisms (MW-U, p<0.01; mixed evidence in 
regressions Table 8), while for low-types and averaged across types no significant payoff 
changes are observed.7 We summarize these observations as follows: 
Result 1. Under random allocation of heterogeneous endowments, both minimum 
contribution schemes based on equal contributions and equal payoffs do not generate larger 
contributions and payoffs than a VCM. 
Result 1 stands in stark contrast to the results in Kesternich et al (2014). Together we can 
therefore conclude that the type of heterogeneity (endowment vs. benefits) has a strong 
influence on the performance of specific distributional rule-based mechanisms. 
Interestingly, the situation changes when considering an effort-based allocation. Here, average 
contributions in the last 5 periods in both burden sharing schemes (eqcont 6.6, eqpay 9.5) are 
significantly larger (at least p<0.1, MW-U, Table 4, regressions Table 6, p<0.05) than in VCM 
(2.9). The difference is driven by increased contributions from both players in eqcont (high: 
7.5, low: 5.7) relative to VCM (high: 3.6, low: 2.3) (at least p<0.1), while particularly high-
types significantly (p<0.01) increase contributions under eqpay (high: 14.1, low: 5.0). 
Consequently, both rule-based mechanisms significantly increase average payoffs and payoffs 
of low-types (at least p<0.1, MW-U; only obtained for eqpay in Table 6, column 6: p<0.01). 
High-types only have significantly larger payoffs under eqcont (p<0.01), these also being 
significantly larger than in eqpay (p<0.01). It is noteworthy that the benefits particularly 
accrue over time: non-parametric tests show a declining trend for payoffs in E-VCM for all 
player types (p<0.01, Table 8), while payoffs are more stable in the rule-based mechanisms, 
in particular E-eqpay.  
We thus can formulate our second result: 
Result 2. Under effort-based allocation of heterogeneous endowments, both minimum 
contribution schemes lead to increases in average contributions and payoffs in contrast to a 
VCM. Low-endowed players benefit from both burden sharing rules. Players with high 
endowments benefit relative to VCM only under the equal-contribution rule which leads to 
strictly larger payoffs than the equal-payoff rule.  
                                                     
7 As can be seen from Figure 3, average profits rather tend to decline over time, most notably in the last 5 periods. The results of a non-
parametric trend test (Table 8) also confirm this downward trend for all treatments under random allocation.  
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For effort-based allocations, Result 2 thus reestablishes the benefits from minimum 
contribution mechanisms that have been identified in the literature for homogeneous agents 
(Orzen 2008, Dannenberg et al. 2010) and under heterogeneities with respect to benefits from 
the public good (Kesternich et al. 2014). Although we found differing results on the 
performance of rule-based mechanisms relative to VCM under random vs. effort-based 
allocations, neither average nor type-specific contribution level significantly differ when 
directly comparing R-eqcont vs. E-eqcont and R-eqpay vs. E-eqpay. For payoffs, the 
difference is only (marginally) significant for high-types who generate larger payoffs in E-
eqpay than R-eqpay (p<0.1).  
Instead, the differences between Result 1 and 2 appear to be partly driven by the significantly 
reduced contributions by high-type players in VCM when turning from a random to an effort-
based allocation of endowments (3.6 vs. 8.3, p<0.05). 8  This already indicates that the 
allocation procedure may change potential fairness norms which trigger voluntary 
contributions: while high-type players are willing to contribute substantially more than low-
type players in R-VCM (p<0.01, Wilcoxon-matched pairs test; further evidence in Table 6, 
columns 5,6), the difference is insignificant under effort-based allocation of endowments in 
E-VCM. 9 
The rule-based mechanisms implement specific burden shares: for both random and effort-
based allocations, the resulting contribution levels under eqcont do not differ across types, 
while high-types contribute significantly more than low-types in eqpay (p<0.01, 
postestimation in Table 6, column 6). As such, it is instructive to have a closer look at how the 
allocation procedure changes the acceptance of the two implemented burden-sharing rules: 
considering the endogenous burden sharing under VCM, one may expect an equal minimum 
contribution requirement (eqcont) to be better suited under effort-based allocation, while the 
stronger contribution requirements for high-types in eqpay might be more acceptable under 
random allocation. To investigate this, we consider two different indicators for the acceptance 
of the implemented burden-sharing rules: (i) the proposed minimum levels 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛  and (ii) 
voluntary contributions, defined by 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 = 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, i.e. contributions which go beyond 
the thereby determined individual minimum contribution levels. 
The summary statistics for minimum proposals and voluntary contribution levels for the rule-
based mechanisms are reported in Table 3. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests on 
                                                     
8 Across all periods, the difference is also significant when comparing average contributions (p<0.1).  
9 Note that high-type players earn more than low-type players in all treatments (p<0.01, MW-U).  
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treatment effects are summarized in Table 5. We again concentrate the discussion on the last 
5 periods. 
As derived in Section 2 and illustrated in Table 1, in equal-contribution schemes payoff-
maximizing high-type players are expected to make a group minimum contribution proposal 
of 𝑄 = 40, while low-types may suggest anything between 40 and 80, in fact leading to 
𝑞𝐿
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑞𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 10. Binding minimum group contribution levels in eqcont are lower under 
effort (20.9) than under random allocation (26.0) in our experimental data (Table 3). In line 
with the theoretical predictions, average proposals from high-type players (random: 44.8, 
effort: 39.1) are lower than those of low-type players (random: 59.8, effort: 44.6). Due to 
differing proposals from the group members, it is further instructive to compare the minimum 
of the type-specific minimum proposals, i.e. min𝑗𝜖high 𝑄𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 vs. min𝑗𝜖low 𝑄𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛. This is larger 
for low-types than high-types under random allocation (49.2 vs. 31.9, p<0.05, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test) in eqcont, while being almost identical under effort-based allocation (30.4 
vs. 31.1). As such, the binding minimum group contribution levels in eqcont predominantly 
stem from high-type players under random allocation (71%), while low-types more often 
determine the binding minimum level under effort-based allocation (52%). Allocating 
endowments based on effort rather than randomly therefore appears to particularly decrease 
the proposals from low-types (p<0.05, Table 5). Considering the distribution of proposals 
allows gaining insights into possible motivation for this decline: under random allocation, 
51% of low-type players’ suggestions correspond to their (potentially) payoff maximizing 
group contribution level (𝑄 = 80), while less than 4% suggest a level which maximizes high-
type players’ payoffs (𝑄 = 40). Under effort-based endowment allocation, the rate of low-
type players suggestions at 𝑄 = 80 drops to 26%, while 13% of suggestions are at 𝑄 = 40. 
This may indicate that low-type players tend to better accept larger payoffs to high-types at 
the expense of their own payoffs under effort-based allocation than under random allocation 
of endowments. In this sense, equal-contribution schemes appear to be accepted under effort-
based allocations, even though this does not result increased total (minimum) contributions. 
In the equal-payoff scheme, we expect both players to suggest 𝑄 = 80 in the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium. Both under random and effort allocation suggestions from low-types (random: 
58.1, effort: 61.7) exceed those of their rich counterparts (random: 34.8, effort: 52.1) (both 
p<0.01, Wilcoxon matched pairs). The same relationship holds when just considering the 
lowest proposal per type (for low-types random: 48.7, effort: 50.1; for high-types random: 
25.3, effort: 41.3). Differently from the equal-contribution schemes, the endowment allocation 
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procedure under the equal-payoff rule primarily affects suggestions by high-type players, 
even though the difference is not significant.  
Comparing both allocation procedures, we see surprisingly similar suggestions for the 
minimum contribution levels under random allocation (for low-types 49.2 vs. 48.7; for high-
types 31.9 vs. 25.3 in R-eqcont and R-eqpay, respectively) even though both mechanisms 
substantially differ in the distribution of burdens. Under effort-based allocation, however, 
proposals from low-types in eqcont are reduced relative to random allocation (p<0.05), while 
high-types tend to make larger proposals in eqpay under effort-based than under random 
allocation (though not significant). Consequently, under effort-based allocation, both player 
types tend to make larger proposals in E-eqpay than in E-eqcont (for low-types, p<0.1). 
It is noteworthy that players voluntarily go beyond the minimum contribution requirement. 
Under the equal-contribution rule, this applies particularly to high-type players (R-eqcont: 1.4, 
E-eqcont: 1.9), and less to low-types (R-eqcont: 0.7, E-eqcont: 0.8). Under equal-payoff rules, 
this is reversed such that voluntary contributions largely stem from low-types (R-eqpay: 0.7, 
E-eqpay: 1.1 for low-types vs. R-eqpay: 0.1, E-eqpay: 0.1 for high-types). As such, the equal-
contribution rule appears to be seen as requiring disproportionately large contributions from 
low-types, while the equal-payoff rule may require too much from high-types. 
We summarize our findings as follows: 
Result 3. (i) No differences in the performance of the rules exist under random allocation, 
and only marginal differences exist under effort-based allocation, both with respect to 
minimum proposals as well as voluntary contributions. (ii) The allocation procedure does not 
significantly affect the efficiency reached under both rule-based mechanisms, while the 
efficiency of the VCM is inferior under effort-based relative to random allocation. 
Our experiment therefore shows that while rule-based mechanisms, in particular the equal-
payoff scheme, can increase contributions to a public good relative to a VCM under effort-
based allocation of endowments, these gains are largely due to the mediocre performance of 
the VCM under effort-based allocation. As such, in particular the equal-payoff scheme can 
counter the failure of individuals to voluntary cooperate when their (endogenously 
determined) endowments differ. However, the equal-payoff rule lifts less than half of the 
possible efficiency gains across players (average contributions 9.5 vs. possible 20). While 
higher efficiency levels were reached in homogeneous settings (Orzen 2008, Dannenberg et 
al. 2014), the efficiency levels we identified under the equal-payoff scheme are similar to 
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those found in Kesternich et al. (2014) under heterogeneities with respect to the marginal 
benefits from the public good (MPCR 0.3 and 0.7, for 2 low- and 2 high-types, respectively; 
endowment 20 tokens for all). 
As a robustness check to this positive interpretation of our results for the equal-payoff rule 
under effort-based allocation, we finally discuss the results from the final treatment which 
introduces an additional dimension of heterogeneity: agents are both unequally endowed 
agents and differ with respect to their benefits from the public good. In contrast to the 
previous treatments, low-type players have a MPCR of 0.8 while benefits for high-type 
players remain at 0.4. Given our experimental setting, players are expected to coordinate 
towards the payoff-dominating equilibrium 𝑄 = 44 which would require 𝑞𝐿 = 10 and  𝑞𝐻 =12 and 𝜋𝐿 = 35.2  and 𝜋𝐻 = 35.6. In this setting, equalizing payoffs at the same time would 
require nearly identical contributions from both types of players which may facilitate 
coordination in contrast to the homogeneous MPCR setting where redistribution of efficiency 
gains is addressed by requiring higher contributions from well-endowed agents. As depicted 
in Figure 1, the payoff to high-type agents is relatively flat for changes in the minimum 
requirement, while low-type agents substantially benefit from increases in the binding group 
minimum level. For any given binding minimum, 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 , both types can generate larger 
payoffs in E-eqpay-MPCR than in E-eqpay. However, we observe players on average to agree 
upon 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 27.3 which is even below the proposals with homogeneous MPCRs in E-eqpay 
(35.7). In particular, high-type players make smaller suggestions, even though these 
differences and also those in contribution behavior are not significant. Comparing E-eqpay 
and E-eqpay-MPCR therefore shows that an increase in marginal benefits does not necessarily 
enhance coordination, even though the distribution scheme is designed such that both players 
benefit. This final treatment thereby further indicates that heterogeneities among players may 
obscure the performance of specific rule-based mechanisms, potentially because players have 
different views on what constitutes a fair distribution. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The (voluntary) provision of public goods relies on effective ways to limit free-riding 
behavior. When the relevant agents are heterogeneous, for example with respect to 
endowment or benefits from the public good, questions arise on how to share the burden of 
the provision of the public good. The perception of fair distributions interacts with issues 
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regarding procedural fairness, i.e. under which circumstances and how these different 
positions are determined.  
In this paper, we experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a 
repeated 4-player public goods game and compare them to a VCM. In our experimental 
setting, the players differ in their individual endowments. With this, we provide a robustness 
check and extend the existing literature that concentrates on homogeneous players or on 
heterogeneous benefits from the public good.  
We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum 
contribution rules, in particular under random allocation. Here, they just appear to redistribute 
voluntary contributions that even would occur under a VCM. Under effort-based allocations, 
however, the schemes generate substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM. These 
efficiency gains can in particular be obtained with a scheme that aims at harmonizing payoffs, 
consistent with findings in Kesternich et al. (2014). However, the improvements relative to 
VCM appear to be largely driven by an even worse performance of the VCM than under 
random allocation as players with high endowment reduce their contributions. Our results 
therefore show that the procedure how allocations are distributed indeed has an impact on the 
potential benefits from using minimum mechanisms, but not necessarily through affecting the 
efficiency of the different rule-based mechanisms themselves. However, endowment 
heterogeneity appears to substantially limit lifting the potential efficiency gains under rule-
based mechanisms. This also holds when low-endowed agents disproportionally benefit from 
contributions to the public good.  
Our results indicate that heterogeneities (randomly or effort-based induced) may induce 
differing views on what agents perceive as a fair distribution, thereby limiting the 
coordination under a given allocation procedure. In this paper, we concentrated on the equal-
payoff and the equal-contribution schemes only. Clearly, other distribution schemes may 
improve upon the performance of the rule-based mechanism, for example a rule which 
distributes burdens proportional to endowment. Furthermore it is worthwhile to explore if an 
endogenous choice of the specific burden sharing rule may lead to further efficiency gains. 
We leave these questions to further research.   
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Table 1: Experimental design 
Treatment Stages No. of subjects (ind. obs.) 
R-VCM contribution stage 48 (12) 
E-VCM real effort task, contribution stage 48 (12) 
R-eqcont minimum and contribution stage 48 (12) 
E-eqcont real effort task, minimum and contribution stage 48 (12) 
R-eqpay minimum and contribution stage 48 (12) 
E-eqpay real effort task, minimum and contribution stage 48 (12) 
E-MPCR-eqpay real effort task, minimum and contribution stage 48 (12) 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for contributions and profits 
Treatment 𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑞𝐿 𝑞𝐻 𝜋𝐿 𝜋𝐻 𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙 
All periods 
R-VCM 7.6 4.1 11.1 18.1 31.1 24.6 
E-VCM 4.3 3.2 5.5 13.8 31.4 22.6 
R-eqcont 8.2 6.6 9.8 16.5 33.3 24.9 
E- eqcont 6.9 5.9 7.8 15.1 33.2 24.1 
R-eqpay 7.0 2.9 11.0 18.2 30.1 24.2 
E-eqpay 9.6 5.1 14.1 20.3 31.2 25.7 
E-MPCR-eqpay 7.1 5.3 8.8 27.3 32.5 29.9 
Periods 1-5 
R-VCM 9.5 5.0 13.9 20.1 31.3 25.7 
E-VCM 5.7 4.0 7.4 15.1 31.8 23.4 
R-eqcont 8.8 6.7 10.9 17.4 33.2 25.3 
E-eqcont 7.2 6.1 8.2 15.3 33.3 24.3 
R-eqpay 7.4 2.7 12.1 19.1 29.8 24.4 
E-eqpay 9.6 5.1 14.1 20.3 31.2 25.7 
E-MPCR-eqpay 7.0 5.5 8.6 27.1 32.6 29.9 
Periods 6-10 
R-VCM 5.8 3.2 8.3 16.0 30.9 23.4 
E-VCM 2.9 2.3 3.6 12.4 31.1 21.8 
R-eqcont 7.6 6.4 8.7 15.7 33.4 24.5 
E- eqcont 6.6 5.7 7.5 14.8 33.1 23.9 
R-eqpay 6.5 3.1 10.0 17.4 30.5 23.9 
E-eqpay 9.5 5.0 14.1 20.3 31.2 25.7 
E-MPCR-eqpay 7.1 5.2 9.0 27.5 32.3 29.9 
Note: 𝑞 = average contributions: per group (𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙), for low-types (𝑞𝐿) and for high-types (𝑞𝐻), 𝜋 = average profits: per group (𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙), for low-
types (𝜋𝐿) and for high-types (𝜋𝐻)  
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Table 3: Summary statistics for minimum proposals and voluntary contributions 
Treatment 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐿 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐻 min (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝) min (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐿) min (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐻) 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝐿 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛.𝐻 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎,𝑎 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎,𝐿 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎,𝐻 
   All periods 
R-eqcont 58.5 45.7 26.1 47.6 31.8 5.6 7.5 1.6 1.0 2.3 
E-eqcont 43.9 37.6 19.6 30.4 28.3 4.7 5.2 2.0 1.3 2.7 
R-eqpay 56.2 37.9 24.1 46.7 26.2 1.9 10.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 
E-eqpay 63.9 52.0 33.4 52.8 40.4 3.4 13.4 1.2 1.7 0.7 
E-MPCR-eqpay 59.5 44.0 24.7 51.0 28.0 4.2 8.2 0.9 1.1 0.7 
   Periods 1-5 
R-eqcont 57.1 46.6 26.3 46.1 31.7 5.5 7.7 2.2 1.2 3.3 
E-eqcont 43.1 36.1 18.3 30.3 25.5 4.4 4.7 2.6 1.8 3.5 
R-eqpay 54.4 41.0 23.8 44.7 27.1 1.5 10.5 1.4 1.3 1.6 
E-eqpay 66.0 51.9 31.1 55.5 39.5 2.8 12.8 1.8 2.3 1.3 
E-MPCR-eqpay 55.7 43.4 22.1 45.1 27.3 3.7 7.4 1.5 1.8 1.2 
   Periods 6-10 
R-eqcont 59.8 44.8 26.0 49.2 31.9 5.7 7.3 1.1 0.7 1.4 
E-eqcont 44.6 39.1 20.9 30.4 31.1 4.9 5.6 1.3 0.8 1.9 
R-eqpay 58.1 34.8 24.4 48.7 25.3 2.4 9.8 0.4 0.7 0.2 
E-eqpay 61.7 52.1 35.7 50.1 41.3 3.9 13.9 0.6 1.1 0.1 
E-MPCR-eqpay 63.2 44.6 27.3 56.9 28.7 4.8 8.9 0.2 0.4 0.1 
Note: 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝  = average minimum contribution proposals from low-type �𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐿� and from high-type (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐻), min(𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝) = minimum of 
the minimum contribution proposals from low-type �min(𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐿)� and from high-type �min(𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝐻)� , 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛 = average binding minimum 
contribution level: for low-type �𝑞min ,𝐿� and for high-type (𝑞min ,𝐻), 𝑞delta = 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛: for low-type �𝑞delta ,𝐿� and for high-type (𝑞delta ,𝐻) 
and averaged over all players (𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎,𝑎) 
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Table 4: Tests between treatments (MW U test) 
















qi all Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
E-VCM <*      <      
R-eqcont > >**     > >***     
E-eqcont > >* <    > >** <    
R-eqpay < > < <   < > < <   
E-eqpay > > > > >  > >* > > >  
MPCR-E-
eqpay 
> > < > < < > > < > >= < 
















qL Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
E-VCM <      <      
R-eqcont >** >***     >*** >***     
E-eqcont >* >*** <    >* >*** <    
R-eqpay < < <*** <***   < > <** <*   
E-eqpay > > < < >  > > < < >  
MPCR-E-
eqpay 
> >* < < >** > > >* < < > < 
















qH Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
E-VCM <**      <**      
R-eqcont < >*     > >**     
E-eqcont < > <    > >* <    
R-eqpay < > > >   < >* < >   
E-eqpay > >* > > >  > >** > > >  
MPCR-E-
eqpay 
< > < > < < > >* > > < < 
















πi all Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
E-VCM <*      <      
R-eqcont > >**     > >***     
E-eqcont > >* <    > >** <    
R-eqpay < > < <   < > < <   
E-eqpay > > > > >  > >* > > >  
MPCR-E-
eqpay 
> >** > >* >** >* > >** > > >* > 
















πL Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
E-VCM <***      <**      
R-eqcont < >**     > >**     
E-eqcont <** > <    < >* <    
R-eqpay < >** > >   < >* > >   
E-eqpay > >** > >* >  > >** > > >  
MPCR-E-
eqpay 
>** >*** >** >*** >** >** > >*** >* >* >* > 
















πH Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
E-VCM >      <      
R-eqcont >*** >***     >*** >***     
E-eqcont >*** >*** >=    >*** >*** <    
R-eqpay <*** <*** <*** <***   < > <*** <***   
E-eqpay >= > <*** <*** >***  > > <*** <*** >*  
MPCR-E-
eqpay 
>*** >*** <** < >*** >*** >* > < > >** >* 
Note: According to a MW-U test, the null hypothesis states that the median of two independent groups is equal. In our case, average 
contributions respectively profits per group over all periods or in the last 5 periods serve as one observation. We compare rows with 
columns. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Example: average contributions 𝑞𝑖 of all players over all periods in eqpay are higher than in 
VCM, this difference is significant at the 1%-level 
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Table 5: Tests between treatments (MW U test): Minimum of minimum contribution 
proposals 
Treatment E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay 
Min(Qmin)all Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
R-eqcont > > < < > > < < 
E-eqcont  > < <  > < < 
R-eqpay   < >   < = 
E-eqpay    >    > 
Treatment E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay 
Min(Qmin)low Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
R-eqcont >** < < < >** < < < 
E-eqcont  < <** <**  < <* <** 
R-eqpay   < <   < < 
E-eqpay    >    < 
Treatment E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay 
Min(Qmin)high Period 1-10 Period 6-10 
R-eqcont > > < > > > < > 
E-eqcont  > < <  > < < 
R-eqpay   < >   < < 
E-eqpay    >    > 
Note: According to a MW-U test, the null hypothesis states that the median of two independent groups is equal. In our case, the average of 
the minimum of the minimum contribution proposal per group over all periods or in the last 5 periods serve as one observation. We compare 
rows with columns. *p<0.1, **p<0.05. Example: average min(Qmin) of low-type players over all periods in R-eqcont are higher than in E-
eqcont, this difference is significant at the 5%-level. 
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Definition of variables 
qi Individual contribution of subject i to the public good 
profit Subject i’s profit  
eqcont = 1 if subject i played treatment R-eqcont/E-eqcont, 0 else 
eqpay = 1 if subject i played treatment R-eqpay/E-eqpay, 0 else  
MPCReqpay = 1 if subject i played treatment E-MPCR-eqpay, 0 else 
per6_10 = 1 for the last 5 periods, 0 else 
per6_10Xeqcont = 1 for the last 5 periods and played R-eqcont/E-eqcont, 0 else 
per6_10Xeqcont = 1 for the last 5 periods and played R-eqpay/E-eqpay, 0 else 
per6_10XMPCReqpay = 1 for the last 5 periods and played E-MPCR-eqpay, 0 else 
eff = 1 if endowment was allocated based on real effort task, 0 else 
effX*burden sharing rule* = 1 under effort allocation and played *burden sharing rule*, 0 else 
high = 1 if subject i is a high-type player, 0 else 
highX*burden sharing rule* = 1 if subject i is a high-type player and played *burden sharing rule*, 0 else 
highXeff = 1 if subject i is a high-type player and effort allocation of endowments 
highXeff*burden sharing 
rule* 
= 1 if subject i is a high-type player and effort allocation of endowments and  
subject i played *burden sharing rule*, 0 else 
male = 1 if subject i is male, 0 if female 
exp number of experiments subject i has taken part in MaXLab 
eco = 1 if subject i is economics student, 0 else 
 
Estimation strategy: 
We report results from using a random-effects Feasible Generalized Least Square estimator (RE FGLS) for determining 
differences in individual contributions and payoffs. 2 individuals had to be removed from the econometric analysis due to 
missing sociodemographic information. Moreover, the discussion of the regression results throughout the paper is based on 
standard errors computed at individual levels. This approach explicitly considers individual heterogeneity across participants. 
For robustness check, we further applied pooled FGLS regressions without explicitly modeling of the individual 
heterogeneity but allowing the error terms of observations from one single individual to be correlated over time. We specified 
the model in a way that error correlation declines as the time differences between observations increase. That is, the decision 
behavior of the current period may be influenced by some effects from past periods (that do not enter the regression as 
explanatory variables) but this effect lowers if time lags increase. In the FGLS random effect model, error correlation can 
only be captured by clustering observations on the individual level without accounting for declining error correlation over 
time. We apply a AR(2) approach which adequately fits to the error correlation observed after running a standard OLS 
regression.  
For estimating contribution decisions, we further run a panel Tobit model. This estimator controls for the fact that the 
dependent variable (individual contributions to the public good) may be left-censored with a known lower limit of 0 (28.71% 
of all contribution decisions). We do not specify an upper limit since endowments vary across individuals. Specification tests 
suggest the Tobit model not to be sensitive to the number of quadrature points used in the estimation process. Similar to the 
regression on payoffs, results for contribution behavior in the pooled model are similar to the random effects model. We 
therefore do not include these results in the paper but provide the tables upon request. 
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Table 6: FGLS Random-effects regression of individual contributions 













       
eqcont -0.529 0.622 1.425 1.815 2.535* 3.310*** 
 (1.917) (1.431) (0.916) (1.875) (1.447) (0.984) 
eqpay -2.094 -4.209** -2.849** 0.757 -1.700 -0.252 
 (2.301) (1.806) (1.125) (2.463) (1.949) (1.301) 
MPCReqpay 1.295 1.930 0.885 4.102** 3.875*** 3.046** 
 (1.586) (1.179) (0.999) (1.846) (1.421) (1.274) 
per6_10 -3.164*** -3.164*** -3.164***    
 (0.355) (0.355) (0.355)    
per6_10Xeqcont 2.241*** 2.241*** 2.241***    
 (0.727) (0.727) (0.727)    
per6_10Xeqpay 2.720** 2.720** 2.720**    
 (1.103) (1.104) (1.104)    
per6_10XMPCReqpay 3.122*** 3.122*** 3.122***    
 (1.044) (1.045) (1.045)    
eff -3.333* -3.259* -1.078 -2.817 -2.761 -1.025 
 (1.769) (1.736) (0.862) (1.761) (1.728) (0.954) 
effXeqcont 1.800 1.431 -0.182 1.729 1.403 -0.152 
 (2.279) (2.243) (1.145) (2.341) (2.308) (1.343) 
effXminQeqpay 5.939* 5.849* 3.177** 5.790* 5.723* 2.866 
 (3.164) (3.151) (1.534) (3.478) (3.477) (1.800) 
high  4.788*** 6.956***  3.391*** 5.118*** 
  (1.198) (1.775)  (1.128) (1.628) 
highXeqcont  -2.216 -3.821*  -1.367 -2.914 
  (1.533) (2.319)  (1.474) (2.221) 
highXeqpay  4.165** 1.506  4.846** 2.000 
  (1.879) (2.584)  (1.900) (2.561) 
highXMPCReqpay  -0.896 1.321  0.795 2.559 
  (1.623) (1.726)  (1.494) (1.679) 
highXeff   -4.398**   -3.500* 
   (2.226)   (2.111) 
highXeffXeqcont   3.304   3.165 
   (2.876)   (2.786) 
highXeffXeqpay   5.352   5.715 
   (3.771)   (3.833) 
male -0.487 -0.957 -0.914 -0.473 -0.879 -0.862 
 (0.812) (0.707) (0.712) (0.877) (0.776) (0.778) 
exp -0.0381 -0.0935 -0.0901 -0.00345 -0.0551 -0.0523 
 (0.0620) (0.0572) (0.0564) (0.0621) (0.0575) (0.0569) 
eco -0.257 0.0233 0.205 -0.177 0.0732 0.217 
 (1.031) (0.882) (0.898) (1.107) (0.965) (0.971) 
Constant 9.815*** 7.966*** 6.775*** 6.118*** 4.917*** 3.977*** 
 (1.793) (1.351) (1.005) (1.808) (1.414) (1.135) 
       
Observations 3,340 3,340 3,340 1,670 1,670 1,670 
R-sq 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.15 
Note: We consider individual level random effects, i.e. one observation for one individual corresponds to the panel variable and the period 
sets the time variable: 334 individual observations x 10 periods (columns 4-6: 5 periods) = 3,340 (1,670) total observations. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, adjusted for group clusters, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7: Time trends in contributions over time  
Treatment R-VCM E-VCM R-eqcont E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay 
All players ▼*** ▼*** ▼* ▼* ▼*   
low-type  ▼*** ▼***      
high-type  ▼*** ▼*** ▼**     
Note: Average contributions per (sub-)group in each of the ten periods of the game serve as one observation. Jonckheere-Terpstra for ordered 
differences of a response variable among classes, the null hypothesis states that the distribution of the frequency of a given contribution level 
does not differ among rounds. ▼:= decreasing profits over time, := increasing profits over time,* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: FGLS Random-effects regression of individual profits 













       
eqcont -0.560 -1.588 -2.372 0.891 0.260 -0.488 
 (1.219) (1.772) (2.233) (1.206) (1.697) (2.146) 
eqpay -1.309 0.698 -0.671 0.441 2.852 1.463 
 (1.407) (2.106) (2.628) (1.491) (2.214) (2.727) 
MPCReqpay 5.851*** 11.16*** 12.21*** 7.688*** 13.82*** 14.59*** 
 (1.890) (3.479) (3.515) (2.275) (4.014) (4.054) 
per6_10 -2.013*** -2.013*** -2.013***    
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.220)    
per6_10Xeqcont 1.459*** 1.459*** 1.459***    
 (0.439) (0.440) (0.440)    
per6_10Xeqpay 1.747*** 1.747*** 1.747***    
 (0.664) (0.665) (0.665)    
per6_10XMPCReqpay 1.933 1.933 1.933    
 (1.388) (1.389) (1.390)    
eff -2.218* -2.000* -4.175** -2.026* -1.790 -3.409* 
 (1.196) (1.107) (2.097) (1.213) (1.104) (2.048) 
effXeqcont 2.104 1.430 3.005 2.166 1.453 2.953 
 (1.557) (1.445) (2.745) (1.628) (1.486) (2.717) 
effXminQeqpay 3.923** 3.614* 6.304* 3.969* 3.638* 6.379 
 (1.976) (1.926) (3.731) (2.148) (2.102) (3.946) 
high  15.21*** 13.05***  16.57*** 14.96*** 
  (1.133) (1.709)  (1.043) (1.597) 
highXeqcont  2.239 3.805*  1.455 2.948 
  (1.480) (2.235)  (1.392) (2.136) 
highXeqpay  -3.924** -1.246  -4.727** -1.996 
  (1.933) (2.588)  (1.940) (2.569) 
highXMPCReqpay  -9.934*** -12.15***  -11.55*** -13.19*** 
  (3.482) (3.516)  (3.696) (3.743) 
highXeff   4.387**   3.264 
   (2.101)   (2.001) 
highXeffXeqcont   -3.226   -3.052 
   (2.806)   (2.713) 
highXeffXeqpay   -5.389   -5.486 
   (3.711)   (3.765) 
male 1.931** 1.012* 0.969* 2.115** 1.135** 1.121** 
 (0.962) (0.523) (0.516) (1.028) (0.575) (0.567) 
exp 0.0881 0.0111 0.00769 0.0982 0.0182 0.0156 
 (0.0759) (0.0431) (0.0427) (0.0770) (0.0416) (0.0410) 
eco -0.389 0.465 0.281 -0.217 0.664 0.532 
 (1.086) (0.664) (0.665) (1.138) (0.710) (0.711) 
Constant 24.08*** 17.21*** 18.40*** 21.75*** 14.24*** 15.12*** 
 (1.273) (1.457) (1.831) (1.282) (1.408) (1.770) 
       
Observations 3,340 3,340 3,340 1,670 1,670 1,670 
R-sq 0.06 0.53 0.54 0.07 0.56 0.56 
Note: We consider individual level random effects, i.e. one observation for one individual corresponds to the panel variable and the period 
sets the time variable: 334 individual observations x 10 periods (last two columns: 5 periods) = 3,340 (1,670) total observations, robust 
standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for group clusters, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 9: Time trends in profits over time 
Treatment R-VCM E-VCM R-eqcont E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay 
All 
players 
▼*** ▼*** ▼* ▼* ▼*   
low-type  ▼*** ▼*** ▼**     
high-type  ▼* ▼***      
Note: Average profits per (sub-)group in each of the ten periods of the game serve as one observation. Statistical results for time trends are 
based on a non-parametric Jonckheere-Terpstra for ordered differences of a response variable among classes, the null hypothesis states that 
the distribution of the frequency of a given profit level does not differ among rounds. ▼:= decreasing profits over time, := increasing 
profits over time,* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1: Theoretical predictions for burden sharing schemes 
 
 eqcont eqpay MPCR-eqpay 
Proposal QLmin 40 80 80 
Proposal QHmin 80 (i) 80 if QLmin ≥ 68  
(ii)  0 else 
(i) 44 if QLmin ≥ 40 
(ii)  0 else 
qL 10 (i) 10/(ii) 0 (i) 10/(ii) 0 
qH 10 (i) 30/(ii) 0 (i) 12/(ii) 0 
πL 16 (i) 32/(ii) 10 (i) 35.2/(ii) 10 
πH 36 (i) 32/(ii) 30 (i) 35.6/(ii) 30 
Note: in eqpay and MPRCR-eqpay, (i) is the payoff-dominant equilibrium  














Welcome to the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MaXLab! 
Please read these instructions carefully and should you have any questions please signal us by 
opening the door or a show of hands. Please do not talk to other participants. Please do not 
use any electronic devises like smartphones. 
In the laboratory experiment you are taking part in, you can win money depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. Your payoff from the experiment will be 
calculated in LabDollars (LD). The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:2, i.e. 1 LD are 
0.50 €. All your decisions made in the experiment will remain anonymous. Only the 
experimenter will know your identity, but your data will be treated confidentially. 
[Additional paragraph for effort based allocation of endowments: 
The experiment consists of an earning stage (stage 1) and a game (stage 2). In order to 
become familiar with the game, please read the following instructions. Thereafter you will get 
additional information on the earning stage via screen.] 
Rules of the game 
Now you will learn more about the rules of the game you will be participating in. Altogether 4 
players take part in the game, so besides you there are 3 more players. The group of 4 players 
has an initial endowment of 80 points. Two players have an initial endowment of 10 points 
each (“low-type”) and two players have an initial endowment of 30 points each (“high-type”).  
[Additional paragraph for random allocation of endowments: 
There will be a random draw whether you are a low- or a high-type.] 
[Additional paragraph for effort-based allocation of endowments: 
Whether you are a low- or a high-type agent will be depend on your effort in the earning stage 
before the game that is described in the following starts] 
Your task in the game, and also your fellow players’ task, is to decide how many points you 
would like to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, can be set between 0 and 10 
points (only integer numbers) if you are a low-type agent or between 0 and 30 points (only 
integer numbers) if you are a high-type agent.  
Your individual and also your fellow players’ payoff will be calculated as follows: 
Your payoff = (E − your contribution to the project) + 0.4·(sum of all contributions of all 
players to the project) 
Assuming you to be a low-type: Your payoff (in LD) will be calculated as follows: 
Payoff = (10 – your contribution to the project) + 0.4·( sum of all contributions of all players 
to the project) 
 
That is, if for example all other players have contributed altogether 70 points to the project 
and your contribution is 10, then your payment will be: 
Payoff = (10 – 10) + 0.4·(70 + 10) = 32 
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If, however, all other players have contributed a total amount of 70 points and you do not 
contribute anything, your payoff will be: 
Payoff = (10 – 0) + 0.4·(70 + 0) = 38 
If you are a high-type, then your payoff (in LD) will be calculated as follows: 
Payoff = (30 – your contribution to the project) + 0.4·( sum of all contributions of all players 
to the project) 
MPCR-eqpay 
Your individual and also your fellow players’ payoff will be calculated as follows: 
Your payoff = (E − your contribution to the project) + b·(sum of all contributions of all 
players to the project) 
The factor b is b = 0.8 for low-types and b = 0.4 for high-types. 
Assuming you to be a low-type: Your payoff (in LD) will be calculated as follows: 
Payoff = (10 – your contribution to the project) + 0.8·( sum of all contributions of all players 
to the project) 
That is, if for example all other players have contributed altogether 70 points to the project 
and your contribution is 10, then your payment will be: 
Payoff = (10 – 10) + 0.8·(70 + 10) = 64 
If, however, all other players have contributed a total amount of 70 points and you do not 
contribute anything, your payoff will be: 
Payoff = (10 – 0) + 0.8·(70 + 0) = 66 
If you are a high-type, then your payoff (in LD) will be calculated as follows: 
Payoff = (30 – your contribution to the project) + 0.4·( sum of all contributions of all players 
to the project) 
The information, whether you are a low-or a high-type will be displayed on your screen. 




There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you choose a minimum contribution, Qmin ≥ 0, 
that should be contributed to the joint by the group as a whole. Simultaneously, all other 
players make their suggestions on a minimum contribution level, Qmin. The minimum of the 
suggested levels, min(Qmin), is then decisive for contributions in the second stage. In stage 2 
you decide on your contribution, q, to the joint project, thereby keeping in mind that for each 
player an individual minimum contribution level, qmin, will be calculated from min(Qmin) such 
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that each player has to contribute at least a quarter of the minimum contribution level of the 
group, i.e. q ≥ 0.25 · min(Qmin). Please keep in mind that low-types cannot contribute more 
than 10 LD such that high-types may contribute more to achieve the minimum group 
contribution level. 
eqpay: 
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you decide on the minimum contribution, 
Qmin, that should be contributed to the joint project by the group as a whole. Simultaneously, 
all other players make their suggestions on a group minimum contribution level, Qmin. The 
minimum of the suggested levels, min(Qmin), is then decisive for contributions in the second 
stage. In stage 2 you decide on your contribution, q, to the joint project, thereby keeping in 
mind that for each player an individual minimum contribution level, qmin, will be calculated 
from min(Qmin). The implementation of these individual minimum contributions, qmin, yields 
to equal payoffs or at least to a harmonization of payoffs. Please note that the harmonization 
of payoffs is subject to the constraint that Qmin will be achieved. 
An example: If the minimum group contribution level is Qmin  = 64 low-type players are 
bound to an individual minimum contribution of qmin = 6 and high-type agents face qmin = 26. 
Assuming these contribution levels, the payoff for each player would be 29.6 LD. If, however, 
Qmin= 20, minimum contribution for high-types is qmin = 10 and for low-types qmin = 0. The 
payoff for a high-type subject would be 28 LD and for a low-type subject would amount 18 
LD. 
MPCR-eqpay: 
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you decide on the minimum contribution, 
Qmin, that should be contributed to the joint project by the group as a whole. Simultaneously, 
all other players make their suggestions on a group minimum contribution level, Qmin. The 
minimum of the suggested levels, min(Qmin), is then decisive for contributions in the second 
stage. In stage 2 you decide on your contribution, q, to the joint project, thereby keeping in 
mind that for each player an individual minimum contribution level, qmin, will be calculated 
from min(Qmin). The implementation of these individual minimum contributions, qmin, yields 
to equal payoffs or at least to a harmonization of payoffs. Please note that the harmonization 
of payoffs is subject to the constraint that Qmin will be achieved. 
An example: If the minimum group contribution level is Qmin  = 24 low-type players are 
bound to an individual minimum contribution of qmin = 1 and high-type agents face qmin =11. 
Assuming these contribution levels, the payoff for a high-type subject would be 26.2 LD and 
for a low-type subject would amount 25.8 LD. If, however, Qmin= 64, minimum contribution 
for high-types is qmin = 22 and for low-types qmin = 10. The payoff for a high-type subject 
would be 27.2 LD and for a low-type subject would amount 44.8 LD. 
] 
The game consists of 10 separate rounds in each of which you will play the same two-stage 
game remaining the same type. The three other players you will interact with will be the same 
in every round. In every round you decide how many points, q you would like to contribute to 
the joint project. In each round you will receive information on individual contributions (q1 to 
q4), payoffs (Payoff1 to Payoff4) and [in eqcont and eqpay: minimum contribution proposals 
(Qmin1 to Qmin4)] for all your group members and average levels (D). 
If the experiment is complete you will receive the payoff of one of the rounds in € 
(according to the conversion rate stated above). The round to be paid out will be determined 
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randomly. This means you should behave in each round as if it were the round relevant for 
payoff. In the beginning, two trial rounds will be played which are not relevant for payoff. 
 
Control questions 
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the following 
control questions: 
[Additional question in  
eqcont 
Please assume that the four players suggested 4, 16, 52 and 72 as minimum contribution 
levels for the group as a whole to the joint project. Please indicate the range of your possible 
contribution levels to the joint project. 
More than _____ and less than or equal _____ 
Is it possible that the minimum contribution rule forces players to contribute more than their 
own minimum contribution suggestions? 
O yes O no 
eqpay 
Please assume that calculating individual minimum contribution levels, qmin, leads to 2 for 
each of the two low-type players and to 22 for the two high-type players respectively. Please 
indicate the range of your possible contribution levels to the joint project if you are a low-
type. 
More than _____ and less than or equal _____ 
MPCR-eqpay 
Please assume that calculating individual minimum contribution levels, qmin, leads to 1 for 
each of the two low-type players and to 11 for the two high-type players respectively. Please 
indicate the range of your possible contribution levels to the joint project if you are a low-
type. 
More than _____ and less than or equal _____ 
] 
Please assume that your contribution as a high-type to the joint project is 20 points. The 
contributions of the three other group members are 0, 10 and 30. What is your payoff? 
My payoff is _______  
Please assume that your contribution as a low-type to the joint project is 0 points. The 
contributions of the three other group members are 0, 10 and 30. What is your payoff? 
My payoff is _______  
Please assume that all three players have contributed their entire endowment to the project. 
Which of the following contribution levels results in your highest payoff if you are a high-
type (please check the according box)? 
O 0 points  O 5 points  O 10 points  O 30 points 
33 
Please assume that all three players have contributed entire endowment to the project. Which 
of the following contribution levels results in the highest payoff for the group if you are a 
high-type (please check the according box)? 
O 0 points  O 5 points  O 10 points  O 30 points 
If you have answered all questions, please signal us. We will then check your answers. The 
game begins when all participants in the experiment have successfully completed the test. 
Good luck in the experiment! The MaXLab-Team 
 
 
Screenshots for eqpay treatments 
Decision on group provision level  
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Decision on individual contributions  
 
Payoffs 
 
